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Abstract—In the last decade, the advertisement market spread
significantly in the web and mobile app system. Its effectiveness
is also due thanks to the possibility to target the advertisement
on the specific interests of the actual user, other than on the
content of the website hosting the advertisement. In this scenario,
became of great value services that collect and hence can provide
information about the browsing user, like Facebook and Google.
In this paper, we show how to maliciously exploit the Google
Targeted Advertising system to infer personal information in
Google user profiles. In particular, the attack we consider is
external from Google and relies on combining data from Google
AdWords with other data collected from a website of the Google
Display Network. We validate the effectiveness of our proposed
attack, also discussing possible application scenarios. The result
of our research shows a significant practical privacy issue behind
such type of targeted advertising service, and call for further
investigation and the design of more privacy-aware solutions,
possibly without impeding the current business model involved
in online advertisement.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online advertisement (also referred as “ad” in the following)
generates a business of hundreds of billions dollars.1 Online
ad companies help advertisers to reach the best possible
consumers, i.e., those users that would be more sensible to
a specific type of ads. Google is currently dominating the
online ad market, thanks to two dedicated services: AdSense2,
through which everyone can easily create advertisements.
The Google ads framework involves three main actors: the
advertiser, the publisher, and the customer. The customer is
every user navigating the Web and seeing online ads. The
advertiser wants to reach the customer, in order to show
her ads, the publisher sells a space on her website to the
advertiser: ads are shown to the visitors of that website. In the
whole process, Google acts as a mediator between advertisers
and publishers, telling which advertisement has to be shown
on which website, depending on the type of visitors that
website has. Furthermore, the advertiser can specify the type of
1Techcrunch.com: Internet Ad Spend To Reach $121B In 2014, 23% Of
$537B Total Ad Spend, Ad Tech Boosts Display: on.tcrn.ch/l/qsMM
2www.google.com/adwords/
audience to reach, achieving the so called targeted advertising.
Targeted advertising has the double advantage (when com-
pared to non-targeted ones) to be interesting for the advertiser
and—at the same time—pleasant for the customer, which
receives ads closer to her interest. Nonetheless, the Google
targeted advertising system is exploitable to reveal personal
information of the customers: knowing that a specific ad has
been shown to a user may simply reveal her interests [1], [2].
Contributions: In this paper, we design and test a novel
attack to discover personal data (such as users interests, stored
in the Google ads users’ profile), based on ad impressions.
Our approach is particularly novel in the fact that we can
reconstruct the user profile “remotely”, i.e., without having
any direct access to the advertisements the user sees.
Roadmap: In the following section, we present the Google
targeted advertising system. Section III describes the attack
that can be remotely launched to discover the users’ profile. In
Section IV, we show our experimental results that confirm the
feasibility of the proposal. Section V discusses related work
in the area. Section VI gives final remarks.
II. THE GOOGLE TARGETED ADVERTISING SYSTEM
Google offers a complex and rich system for targeted
advertising, through the so called DoubleClick infrastructure.
This can manage several types of ads: display-based ads
(located within pages of websites), search-based ads (which
appear among the results of a Google search), ads in the
YouTube platform and ads in the Gmail service. In this work,
we will focus on display-based ads.
The two main components of the Google targeted advertis-
ing system are AdSense and AdWords. AdSense is used by
all the publishers that aim at being part of the Google Display
Network (GDN), i.e., the network of websites that give their
availability to host ads (ad display websites). AdWords is the
service used by the advertisers to create the ads to be displayed
on the ad display websites. Being part of GDN with AdSense
has a monetary return for the publishers. Indeed, after a certain
number of impressions, the publisher obtains an amount of
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Figure 1. Targeted Advertising based on user profiles and page profile
money as a reward. Correspondingly, buying ad spaces with
Google AdWords allows the advertiser to generate and manage
several type of ads, including those with high personalization.
The Google patent on “Targeted Advertising based on user
profiles and page profile” [3] describes (at a high level) the
way Google provides personalized advertising.
As illustrated in Figure 1, when a user visits a GDN
website, she may visualize, along with the page content, both
generic and personalized advertisements. Personalization is
possible because Google monitors the GDN website content
and users’ navigation behavior. In particular, for each GDN
website, a Content Analysis module evaluates the content of
the GDN web pages and builds a page profile for each of
them, associating to each page a list of topics3. Topics include
general categories (e.g., sport, car, art, music, and movies) as
well as sensitive and detailed information (e.g., pathologies
and sexual interests). Then, Google builds ad user profiles,
monitoring and learning users’ behaviors when they navigate
the GDN websites. When a user visits a GDN website, her
browser exchanges a DoubleClick cookie tracing the navi-
gation behavior, as described in the Google patent [3]. The
main elements considered are the list of the visited websites,
website topics, webpage referral, time spent on each website,
number of times the user went to the website, geo-location
of the user IP address (if available), visualized advertisements
and number of clicks on them. The navigation behavior results
in the definition of the user’s interests4, which, collectively,
represent the “ad user profile”. The patent in [3] describes
how Google builds both page profiles and ad user profiles.
As shown in Figure 2, at www.google.com/settings/ads is
possible to access the ad user profile. It is worth noting that
Google stores the ad user profile (gender, age, languages, and
interests) through the DoubleClick cookie. Interestingly, if the
user signs in with her Google account, the ad profile would
access gender, age and languages explicitely inserted by the
user when creating her account. In Figure 2, the gender and the
age are instead inferred by Google according to the navigation
3support.google.com/adwords/answer/156178?hl=en
4support.google.com/ads/answer/2842480?hl=en
Figure 2. Ad user profile for Google ads.
activity of an unlogged user across the Web.
A. Google AdWords: building and targeting a campaign
AdWords makes it easy for an advertiser to create online
advertisements by means of a visual browser interface. To
configure a campaign, the user starts specifying the “good
landing URL”, i.e., the destination URL of the user that clicks
on the advertisement. Then she has to define the advertisement
to show and the keywords describing the good (in case of
search-based ads). Afterwards, it sets the placement, i.e., the
set of websites where the ad will be displayed (in case of
display-based ads), and the time and the geographical location
the ad will appear. The next steps consist of selecting the
audience to reach (details on the kind of available audience
are discussed below) and in setting the total budget and the bid
(i.e., how much the advertiser will pay for each ad impression).
The choice of the audience is a very important step, since
it determines the type of users that will see the ads. There are
several types of audiences: people who previously visited the
advertiser website (in market audience); people with specific
age, gender, parental status and so on (demographic audience);
and, people interested in the specific products or services of
the advertiser (affinity audience). An affinity audience consists
of aggregated users that have demonstrated a qualified interest
in a certain topic. In particular, being part of an affinity
audience means featuring common navigation behavior on
GDN websites with specific topics. Examples of pre-defined
affinity audiences are Cooking enthusiasts, Sports fans, Movie
lovers, and many others5. In addition, AdWords further refines
the campaign an advertiser would like to launch, by giving her
the possibility to reach exactly the audience she is looking for,
specifying a list of websites users should have visited before
being exposed to the campaign. Having visited such websites
let users be part of custom affinity audiences6.
To represent the relation between topics, interests and
audiences, we refer to Figure 3. Mike, John and Leonard
belong to the affinity audience “Sports Fans”. This is because
they share a common navigation behavior through websites
related to the same topics (Sports, Soccer, Sports News).
Furthermore, checking the users’ interests (the ones in the ads
5For a detailed list of Google affinity audiences, see:
storage.googleapis.com/think/docs/affinity-audiences products.pdf
6adwords.blogspot.it/2014/10/introducing-custom-affinity-audiences.html
Figure 3. Example of relation between topics, interests and audience
settings shown in Figure 2), we can see that the three users
are interested in Sport and Soccer.
Regarding a campaign budget, the advertiser needs to
choose the total budget and to set the bidding option for
each ad. AdWords provides several bidding options, depending
on what matters most to the advertiser and her business.
Advertisers can focus on clicks, impressions, and conver-
sions/acquisition, where acquisition means buying a good,
booking a reservation or also registering to a mailing list.
Available AdWords bidding options are “cost per click” (CPC),
“cost per 1000 impressions” (CPM), “cost per acquisition”
(CPA) and automatic bidding. Choosing the appropriate bid-
ding is very important, since Google makes online auctions—
based on the received bid values—among all the competing
advertisers. Then, Google delivers the winning ad to the user
when the latter visits the publisher page.
AdWords provides a friendly interface showing how often
the ad has got an impression or a click, and if it has reached
some demographic or affinity audience.
III. TRAP: TARGETED ADS TO INFER AD PROFILES
As shown in previous work (further discussed in Section V),
having access to displayed ads can lead an attacker to know
users’ personal information, like their interests and their nav-
igation behavior. Here, we go beyond the state of the art by
showing settings for and feasibility of a remote attack capable
of discovering the user affinity audience and, consequently,
inferring the information in the user ads settings. Indeed, since
affinity audiences are set according to users navigation habits,
if an attacker is able, e.g., to discover that a user is in the
affinity audience “Job Seekers”, this means that she has visited
recruitment and employment agency websites. This can lead
to infer that she is looking for a new job and raise privacy
concerns (think, for example, if such information is disclosed
to the current boss of the user).
TRAP is a system for inferring user affinities of a victim
user, whenever a victim visits a website controlled by the
attacker, where an advertisement controlled by the attacker
is displayed. Correlating the information from the website
(such as the log of visiting IP addresses) and the information
collected by the AdWords system, the attacker could recon-
struct information related to the (supposedly private) affinity
audiences of the victim.
A. Attack setup
To set up all the components, the attacker follows those steps:
1) Website set up. She sets up a website that will be part of
the GDN, registers it on AdSense and monitors the visitors’
accesses;
2) Ad campaign set up. She sets up an ad campaign through
AdWords, with a series of ad-hoc advertisements for several
(different) affinity audiences, which will be intentionally dis-
played only on that particular GDN website;
3) Revealing the affinity audience. She analyzes and com-
pares the AdWords data with the web users’ accesses, to infer
the affinity audiences and, eventually, the users’ interests.
In the following, we detail each of the steps and we describe
how we have realized TRAP and the attack.
1) Website set up. The first step consists in setting up a
page where we can host advertisements. For this purpose, it
is enough to create and manage a website and ask Google to
add it into the GDN, in order to serve advertisements and,
eventually, to use it as controlled location of our ads.
We have created a fake project website (available at
www.monadsproject.com). We have populated the website,
adding consistent and relevant contents, to make it suitable for
serving ads through AdSense, joining the GDN. A website can
be part of the GDN only when its content is sufficient enough
for the Google crawler to automatically infer its topics. After
the AdSense analysis of the page contents, our website has
been assigned to many topics, like, e.g., Scientific Institutions,
Scripting Languages, and others. We have also added a privacy
policy explaining how we manage collected data. The website
includes a landing page where the user is explicitly asked to
proceed to visit the website and share her data or not, to obtain
her agreement before acquiring and analyzing her data. Her
preference is stored inside a cookie on her browser.
Finally, to put in place the attack, there is the need to
monitor in real-time the visitors activity on the website: this
is fundamental to identify the access of the victims to the
website, in order to subsequently correlate it to the shown
advertisement. For this step, several solutions are possible, like
directly reading the server log or relying on professional statis-
tic providers. For our experiments, we relied on StatCounter7,
which, beside the log of each website access, also provides
synthetic and aggregated statistics of the visited pages.
2) Ad campaign set up. The second building block con-
sists of setting up a personalized advertisement campaign—
intentionally limited to appear on our website. We have
registered into AdWords and we have followed standard proce-
dures. To realize the attack, it is important to create a campaign
that relies on affinity audiences comprising the interests we
would like to extract from the victim’s ad profile. Moreover,
it is critical to specify that the only website displaying the
7www.statcounter.com
advertisement must be ours: actually, this is the main trick
to track the audience, and, consequently, the interests of our
victims. As it will be clear in the following, if the ad is
displayed in more than one website, this perturbs the statistics
on AdWords, making the association victim–interest no more
possible.
We have created a Google AdWords campaign named
european projects, with an advertisement group mib project
that contains our TRAP ad, i.e., our hook for the attack. Each
of the possible features of the campaign should be carefully
set, keeping in mind the target user, victim of the attack.
Beside the choice of the placement website, other elements
allowing to restrict the range of users that will receive an
impression with our TRAP ad are, e.g., the geographical area,
the gender, and the age.
The most important element to configure for the ad cam-
paign is the affinity audience to target. AdWords will take
note of the number of impressions of our TRAP ad, for each
of the audiences set in the campaign. Being able to link
each impression to a specific user means to reveal the affinity
audience of that user. In our implementation, we have selected
ten affinity audiences (among others: cooking enthusiasts, pet
lovers, sports fans, music lover, and health & fitness buffs).
Another important element to be set is the budget, together
with the bidding. Among all the advertisements that match
their affinity audiences with the user interests, Google chooses
the one with the higher bid (for example CPM, cost per 1000
impressions). Consequently, for the attack to be effective, an
adequate bid has to be set, in order to guarantee that it will be
chosen among all the competing advertisements. If the attacker
wants to be really effective, she can set a very high CPM so
that, with high chances, her victims will receive the impression
of her TRAP ad. We have created an ad with a bidding based
on the number of impressions, however the AdWords interface
reports both impressions and clicks (Figure 4).
3) Revealing the affinity audience. The third step leads
to reveal the affinity audience of the victim. Each time a new
user comes onto our website and our TRAP ad receives a new
impression, the AdWords increments the counter of the relative
affinity audience (Figure 5). Moreover, since the webpages that
impress the TRAP ad are hosted on our website, we can access
the log or the single visits (as above described) to our page.
Then, putting in relation the affinity audience that received a
new impression with the visit of the user, we can associate
each user to the relative affinity audience. This, in practice,
means inferring her navigation behavior and, eventually, her
interests. Moreover, with these settings, the TRAP attack can
also keep track of the users that clicked on our TRAP ads, not
just the impressions. Analyzing the clicks is not considered in
this work, but can be used for further analysis.
One limitation of this approach is that the number of
impressions and clicks received by ads are updated every 30
minutes. Then, in order to be effective, the attack has to be
suitably timed to be sure to make distinguishable the access of
the victims. However, this limitation can be easily bypassed if
the attacker creates and monitors a single website for each of
Figure 4. AdWords Impressions
Figure 5. Attack scenario
her victims: even if it can be tedious and time consuming, it
is simple and can also be easily automatized, with a random
website generator with a database of pages with real contents.
We highlight that the TRAP attack is completely silent and
transparent for the victims. It allows to discover users interests
by only analyzing the ads Google showed them.
IV. ATTACK VALIDATION
We show the feasibility and the effectiveness of the attack
by implementing it in a controlled environment (i.e., not
involving real users). In particular, we emulate ten users with
ten different ad profiles. We let them visit one or more websites
with certain topics (e.g., sport), from a web browser with
clean navigation data. As a result, Google adds to the ad
profile of each users the related interests (e.g., sport or some
subcategory, such as baseball, tennis, etc.). Table I reports the
websites visited by the 10 users, with the related websites
topics.
We leverage the Google display planner for selecting the
Table I
FILLING AD USER PROFILES
User Visited Websites Visited Websites Topics User’s Interests
u1 theatrehistory.com Arts & Entertainment; Acting & Theater; Literary Classics Acting & Theater; Broadway & Musical Theater; History
u2 carbuzz.com Autos & Vehicles; Custom & Performance Vehicles; Vehicle Brands Autos & Vehicles; Performance Vehicles; Vehicle Brands
u3 delish.com Cooking & Recipes; Fruits & Vegetables; Food Beverages; Cooking & Recipes; Fruits & Vegetables
u4 movieinsider.com Movies; Online Video; Movie Reviews & Previews Movie Reviews & Previews
u5 www.soundjay.com Arts & Entertainment; Samples & Sound Libraries; Audio Files
Formats & Codecs
Audio Files Formats & Codecs; Samples & Sound Libraries
u6 kingpet.com Arts & Entertainment; Pets; Dogs Arts & Entertainment; Contests, Awards & Prizes; Dogs
u7 thesportspost.com Sports; Team Sports; Sports News American Football; Baseball; Fantasy Sports; Sport News
u8 onetravel.com Travel; Air Travel; Travel Agencies & Services Air Travel; Travel Agencies & Services
u9 talkaboutmarriage.com Arts & Entertainment, Family & Relationships, Troubled Relationships Family & Relationships, marriage; Parenting, Childcare
u10 youbeauty.com
beautytask.com
beautyandtips.com
Beauty & Fitness Apparel; Bodybuilding; Cosmetology & Beauty Profession-
als; Hair Care; Make-Up & Cosmetic; Skin & Nail Care
websites to visit in order to fill the profiles as we like. The
Google display planner of AdWords allows to select those
GDN websites that better match a given topic. The planner
shows an ordered list of the websites more relevant to certain
interests, specified by selecting a interest category or by simply
entering keywords. For each website, it displays a set of
charts related to the available visitor population (age, sex,
devices), together with the topic of the website and the format
of ads they display. As an example, when selecting Sport,
the most suitable website is the first online sport magazine
thesportpost.com . Opening the website details, it is possible
to see that it hosts ads in any format and covers the following
topics: Sports, Team Sports, Sports News. When a visitor with
a clean profile visits this website, Google infers the following
interests because of this online activity: American Football,
Baseball, Fantasy Sports, Sport News.
A. Experiment and Results
We let the ten users (with ad profiles filled according to
a specific past navigation activity) visit the Monads website,
which displays the TRAP ads. For each user, we combine
information gathered from our monitoring activity with the
data taken from AdWords. By doing so, we are able to match
a visit event with an impression event and we infer the affinity
audience of each user. We ultimately discover the interest
of each user since we exactly know which is the TRAP ad
each user sees on Monads, because a particular audience (e.g.,
Sports Fans) is incremented by one.
In Table II, we show the affinity audience that has been
inferred for all the users under investigation. The result of
the experiment confirms that TRAP is able to discover the
users’ interest through remote management and monitoring
of targeted ads. As shown in Table II, in facts, the audience
learned with our approach corresponds to the user interests or,
at least, to a subclass of them. Many associations are obvious
and self-explanatory. User u10 needs some more explanation,
since Fitness is a subcategory of Beauty: Health and Fitness
buffs are those that care about their body and appearance.
B. Attack optimization
Aiming at raising the probability to attract the victim to the
attacker website, a possible optimization of our approach is
Table II
REAL USERS’ INTERESTS vs AFFINITY AUDIENCE INFERRED BY
IMPRESSION
User User’s Interests Affinity Audience of
the Displayed Ad
u1 Acting & Theater; Broadway & Musical Theater; History Art & Theater Afi-
cionados
u2 Autos & Vehicles; Performance Vehicles; Vehicle Brands Auto Enthusiasts
u3 Beverages; Cooking & Recipes; Fruits & Vegetables Cooking Enthusiasts
u4 Movie Reviews & Previews Movie Lover
u5 Audio Files Formats & Codecs; Samples & Sound Li-
braries
Music Lover
u6 Arts & Entertainment; Contests, Awards & Prizes; Dogs Pet Lover
u7 American Football; Baseball; Fantasy Sports; Sport News Sports Fans
u8 Air Travel; Travel Agencies & Services Travel Buffs
u9 Family & Relationships, marriage; Parenting, Childcare Family focused
u10 Apparel; Bodybuilding; Cosmetology & Beauty Profes-
sionals; Hair Care; Make-Up & Cosmetic; Skin & Nail
Care
Health & Fitness
Buffs
the use of personalized emails and spear phishing [4]. This
technique exploits trusted source email addresses (spoofed
or not) to invite victim users to visit some website or to
pass a unique argument when requesting a webpage (like
http://monadsproject.com?uniquearg=xyz). Clearly, inserting a
tracking element in the email (like uniquearg=xyz above),
let the attacker infer the victim’s interests if she visits the
website as suggested in the email. The tracking element could
also be a unique embedded image, used to monitor when the
recipient accesses the content of the email: this would require
a download from the website, unique for the target recipient.
A similar technique is used by tracking services, like Streak8
for Gmail. The same approach can be extended to a group
of victims, within a set of known IP addresses—for example,
the subnetwork of a public institute or a company. It can also
be extended to collect statistics on the interest that occurs
more within the group, leveraging TRAP ads targeted for two
complementary audiences, e.g., family focused vs travel buffs.
V. RELATED WORK
In literature, several works deal with behavioral targeting
in Online Ad Systems, highlighting their potential privacy
threats [5]. The novelty of the current work is that it presents
and maliciously exploits a feature of the Google advertising
system, which allows a remote attacker to infer user personal
8www.streak.com/email-tracking-in-gmail
information, as interests and navigation behavior. In the fol-
lowing we review the main research works related to privacy
issues and online advertisement.
1) Privacy violations: In [1], Castelluccia et al. show how
to reconstruct user profiles from targeted ads displayed on
the users’ browser. They provide a technique to automatically
discriminate among different kind of ads shown to the user:
generic, page based, location based, profile based. Finally,
from profile-based ads they infer users’ interests. This work is
complementary to ours, since it considers a different adversary
model where the attacker is physically behind the computer
victim and sees the displayed ads in her browser. Instead, in
our scenario, the TRAP ad allows to infer the victim’s data
without any access to the victim browser.
In [2], Korolova considers privacy violations in Facebook
through microtargeted ads. From publicly available informa-
tion of a Facebook account and with ad-hoc ads, the author
shows that it is possible to infer either private information or
information that the user had configured as Only me, Friends
only, and Hide from these people. More broadly, one can run
campaigns in order to infer age or gender distribution of em-
ployees of particular companies, estimate the amount of time
employees spend on Facebook, the fraction of employees who
are interested in job opportunities elsewhere, etc. Similarly,
in [6], [7], Cascavilla et al. show several techniques to retrieve
supposedly hidden information from Facebook user profile,
while they do not rely on advertisements.
Targeted ads are connected with users’ navigation behavior.
Even if users may have online interests formed and confirmed
over a long time period, also short term browsing activity
can significantly impact the user’s profile and, consequently,
change the type of ads that such user sees. In [8], the authors
show that publishers can subtly alter the user’s profile, in
order to make them the target of the most remunerative ads.
In [9], Bechmann highlights how profiling is related to pri-
vacy violations through a media economics and management
perspective. The author analyzes different perspectives on dif-
ferent social media. Facebook focuses on user interconnections
and reputation (vertical view) while Google on topic relevance
(horizontal view). The work also highlights the implications
of profiling for different stakeholders: advertisers, developers
and government agencies. Work in [10] analyzes the Levi’s
company case. The popular brand traces users’ navigation
behavior through its e-commerce website, it collects data
about users and it sends them to third party websites that
provide ads, without the user’s explicit consent. When dealing
with an e-commerce website, the privacy concern is even
higher: camouflaging the tracking of consumers can damage
the perceived trustworthiness of the brand.
2) Personalization: Background and mechanisms behind
the Google search engine and its advertising system are
presented in the Google patents [11] and [3]. While the patents
describe the big ads picture, they however do not reveal
details about the level of personalization in Google search
and displayed ads. Relevant personalization in query results
and ads would lead to concerns about the “Filter Bubble”
effect, where users are trapped into information bubbles be-
cause the search engine algorithms decide such information
is relevant for them [12], [13]. In [14], the authors present a
measurement methodology for determining the effectiveness of
personalized online advertising. It includes a set of guidelines
for researchers that wish to study advertising systems and
an analysis of the key factors that determine ad targeting on
Google and Facebook.
Finally, work in [15] presents a system for personalized
web search based interest tree, a classifier able to learn users
interests and profiles from browser history. The algorithm then
reorders search results, achieving high user satisfaction. The
description of the system includes many details about the
features considered by search engines in order to determine
the users’ interests and to combine them in order to understand
how each feature is relevant with respect to such interests.
3) Privacy-preserving advertising systems: As analyzed
in [16], there exist technologies enabling the delivery of
third-party services with affordable privacy risk. Some initial
efforts have been put in designing targeted advertising models
yet preventing users from being tracked by ad networks,
as Privad [17] and Adnostic [18]. Their main idea is to
keep behavioral information at the client side and to select
locally the ads. Furthermore, advertisers cannot target sensitive
information, like, e.g., health, finances, ethnicity, race, sexual
orientation, personal relationships and political activity.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
With behavioral targeted advertising, the user that visits a
GDN website can see ads relevant to her real interests, inferred
from her browsing patterns. In this paper, we have seen how
the technical details that allow to realize this mechanism can
be exploited by an attacker to infer users specific interests,
without directly interacting with the users themselves. The
methodology can be exploited to target specific users by at-
tackers really determined in discovering their interests, clearly
violating the privacy of unaware users. We have also described
how to extend our TRAP system in order to overcome the slow
update limitation of the AdWords system.
While in this paper we did a preliminary assessment of
the feasibility of the attack, we plan to further validate it,
considering real user profiles (with the user approval).
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